



# The Utility Cybersecurity Challenge: Converging Information and Operational Technologies

---

Philip Propes  
October 2016

- **The Global Threat**
- Utility Cyber Perspective
- TVA Cyber Perspective
- Establishing a Defense



## Increased Connectivity is a Global Demand



## Home Automation

**NEW Online Services Available!**


**Save Time. Go Online!**



- ✓ Renew Your Driver License
- ✓ Renew Your ID Card
- ✓ Replace Your Lost DL or ID
- ✓ Renew Your Boat Registration
- ✓ Schedule Your Appointment
- ✓ Order a Crash Report



Online bill pay.  
Fast. Easy. Convenient.




Increased Internet Speed is a Global Reality

*4G INTERNET*

**7 10GB**  
SpainSur

**1Gig Internet**

**100MB**  
ডায়াল \*5000\*110#  
**BROADBAND**

Business t1

**50K**  
almost anywhere in Canada



## Increased Simplicity is a Global Threat

OS and Service detection performance  
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host)  
#

1 0.4  
2 0.41 ms sc

Facebook Hacking Tools

Nessus

Reports

Plugins

root@root: ~#

SHODAN ICS Radar

Protocols

BACnet: 10,530  
DNP3: 588  
EtherNet/IP: 3,943  
Modbus: 13,949  
Niagara Fox: 23,294  
Niagara Fox with SSL: 155  
Siemens S7: 2,701

SCADA Shutdown Tool v1.0 Beta - Powered by DxDf

Target

IP Address: 7.7.7.50  
Port: 502  
Unit ID: 1

Register types

Coil Outputs Offset range: 0 - 50  
 Digital Inputs Offset range: 0 - 50  
 Analogue Inputs Offset range: 0 - 50  
 Holding Registers Offset range: 0 - 50  
 Extended Registers Offset range: 0 - 50

Options

Safe-mode (read only non-zero values)  
 Real-mode (rewrite only non-zero values)  
 Aggressive mode (rewrite all registers)

Shutdown value: 1

Shutdown


Console

[INFO] Starting Shutting down process!  
Holding Register value: 40001 :22  
Holding Register value: 40002 :100  
Holding Register value: 40011 :144  
Holding Register value: 40021 :300  
Holding Register value: 40022 :400  
Holding Register value: 40023 :500  
Holding Register value: 40024 :200  
Holding Register value: 40025 :300  
Holding Register value: 40031 :50  
Holding Register value: 40032 :60  
Holding Register value: 40033 :75  
Holding Register value: 40034 :40  
Holding Register value: 40035 :50

Process completed successfully!

## Current Cyber Attack Trends


Motivations Behind Attacks  
August 2016



Nation-State activities such as cyber espionage and cyber warfare are increasing.

Over half of successful cyber attacks target people and computer-related behaviors.

Attack Vectors  
August 2016



Source: Hackmageddon.com

## The Perfect Storm for Cyber Attacks

- More connected devices
- Internet speeds increasing exponentially
- Simple and more powerful hacking tools
- Online training and videos on tool use
- Increasing activity of nation-states

The world is becoming a dangerous place.



## Cyber Breaches are a Global Issue

NBC NEWS HOME TOP VIDEOS DECISION 2016

### Russians Hacked Two U.S. Voter Databases, Officials Say

FORTUNE

### Oracle's Data Breach May Explain Spate of Retail Hacks

POPULAR SCIENCE

### WHO HACKED THE NSA?

THE MYSTERY BEHIND THE IDENTITY OF THE SHADOW BROKERS, AN EIGHT-FOOT-TALL ALIEN, AND THE DIPLOMATIC CHESS GAME SURROUNDING A 234 MB LEAK

CNN politics

Election 2016 Nation World

First on CNN: FBI investigating Russian hack of New York Times reporters, others

NETWORKWORLD  
FROM IDG

### Dyn attack: US Senator wants to know why IoT security is so anemic

ars TECHNICA BIZ & IT TECH SCIENCE POLICY CARS GAMING & CULTURE FORUM

RISK ASSESSMENT —

### Yahoo says half a billion accounts breached by nation-sponsored hackers

The Washington Times

HOME NEWS

### IRS computer hack was worse than agency admitted

FORTUNE

### LinkedIn Lost 167 Million Account Credentials in Data Breach

COMPUTERWORLD  
FROM IDG

NEWS

### Hackers breach DOJ, dump details of 9,000 DHS employees, plan to leak 20,000 from FBI




- The Global Threat
- **Utility Cyber Perspective**
- TVA Cyber Perspective
- Establishing a Defense




## Critical Cyber Event Response by Sector, 2015

TVA is active in sectors encompassing 40% of total cyber events in 2015.



*As reported by the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US CERT)*

## Observed Depth of Intrusion, 2015



Of 295 reported intrusions, 39 (13%) reached the corporate network, while 22 (7%) reached critical systems. The frequency and impact are on the rise.

## Attackers Target People as Often as Systems

"...spear phishing represented 37 percent of the total incidents. Being relatively easy to execute and demonstrably effective, spear phishing continues to be a common method of initial access against critical infrastructure targets."

~US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US CERT)




Figure 2. FY 2015 Incidents by Attempted Infection Vector, 295 total.

## Our Industry is Being Targeted

### RUSSIA

**TARGETS:** Electricity, manufacturing, oil and gas

**CAPABILITY:** Penetrate IT, OT / ICS networks

**OBJECTIVES:** Geopolitically driven disruption and destruction of infrastructure

**RISK:** Likely to conduct attacks against US; likely to target ICS operators; unlikely to cause disruptions or destruction against US

### NORTH KOREA

**TARGETS:** Light rail and electricity

**CAPABILITY:** Penetrate IT and ICS networks

**OBJECTIVES:** Retaliatory strikes against national adversaries

**RISK:** Likely to conduct disruptive or destructive attacks outside US; possible disruptive or destructive attacks against US ICS operators



### IRAN

**TARGETS:** Electricity, water, and dams

**CAPABILITY:** Penetrate IT, OT / ICS networks

**OBJECTIVES:** Retaliatory strikes against national adversaries; establish persistent access as contingency for future conflicts

**RISK:** Likely to target US ICS operations; unlikely to cause disruptions or destruction

### CHINA

**TARGETS:** Electricity, manufacturing, oil and gas, light rail, water and dams

**CAPABILITY:** Penetrate IT, OT / ICS networks

**OBJECTIVES:** Traditional espionage; support of national economic interests through intellectual property theft; establish persistent access as contingency for future conflicts

**RISK:** Highly likely to conduct attacks against US; highly likely to target US ICS operations; unlikely to cause disruptions or destruction

Source: "Industrial Cybersecurity Threat Briefing"; Booz, Allen, Hamilton; [www.boozallen.com/ics](http://www.boozallen.com/ics).

## Industry Case Study – The IT/OT Converged Event

### Attack Sequence

- Spear phishing to gain access
- Stole passwords
- Gained access to control network
- Erased control systems and records
- Used the network to impact backup power
- Overwhelmed and disrupted call center



### Outage Data

- 225,000 customers
- 3 service territories
- Several hours

- The Global Threat
- Utility Cyber Perspective
- **TVA Cyber Perspective**
- Establishing a Defense



## TVA – Most Common Incident Sources

- **Electronic Mail**



- **Internet**



- **Removable Media**





## Spam and Malicious Email


- As of September 2016, TVA has received **13,021,585** spam emails (FY16).
- Of those, **17,542** were infected and blocked by TVA.
- Only **7** impacted the TVA recipient.





# TVA Cyber Perspective – Email-Based Incidents

## TVA Cybersecurity Events – FY2016




Events are processed via automation, then by security analysts as they escalate.

TVA also encounters a variety of attack types beyond email, again with analyst escalation. None have been successful to date.



### FY 2016 Attack Events



- The Global Threat
- Utility Cyber Perspective
- TVA Cyber Perspective
- **Establishing a Defense**



## What Does This All Mean?

### Perimeter Defenses Are No Longer Sufficient


- Typical security focuses on building the “cyber castle” to keep attackers at bay
- Attackers and attack tools sought to find holes in the walls, as a single crack could be exploited and entry could be gained

### Attackers Quickly Evolve; Defenders Lag Behind

- Attackers use creative ways to manipulate people into “opening windows” in the wall, allowing for easy access
- Defenders continue to buy technology as fresh “cement” to reinforce their castle walls


### Information and Operational Technology (IT and OT) Convergence

- Attackers have recognized the challenge of the IT/OT gap
- Accessing IT systems via user manipulation is now the gateway of choice to access OT networks and systems
- Outbound communications used to bypass inbound defenses



## The Attack Process, Simplified

- 1. Research and Reconnaissance**
  - Learn about people, processes, and technology
- 2. Scan and Probe**
  - Use gathered data to locate, map, and plan
- 3. Exploit**
  - Leverage discoveries to select and implement a tool
- 4. Elevate and Expand**
  - Expand access via privileges and pivoting to new systems
- 5. Establish a Point of Return**
  - Create a discrete method of return (backdoor)
- 6. Steal or Disrupt**
  - Steal data, disrupt services, destroy/disable systems
- 7. Cover and Conceal**
  - Wipe tracks, create a false trail, and/or distract from point of return



## Practical Steps to a Reasonable Defense

- **Focus on Security, with Compliance as a By-product**
  - Security best practices are the focus
  - Compliant is not synonymous with secure
- **Develop a 3-Year Strategy, with Practical 1-Year Goals**
  - Predict, Protect, Detect, Respond as focal areas
  - Yearly increments to achieve balance across the four goal areas
- **Get the Basics Down**
  - Minimize information exposed publicly; do not share unnecessarily
  - Identify systems and business priorities and focus accordingly
  - Establish the essential perimeter capability
  - Use effective anti-malware tools
  - Use least privilege access model
  - Block and filter anything that isn't necessary
  - Patch with a focus on criticality and risk
  - Encrypt when possible and practical
- **Train, Train, Train**
  - General awareness training to all staff
  - Targeted messages/actions – anti-phishing, how to report, etc.
  - Train your technical staff to detect and respond more efficiently

## Practical Steps to a Reasonable Defense

- **Share Information and Intelligence**
  - Establish relationships with peer companies, industry groups, law enforcement, etc.
  - Locate and sign up for intelligence feeds/sources
- **Know the Normal So You Can Identify the Abnormal**
  - Establish baselines for systems and regular communications
  - Focusing on anomalies is the only practical way to handle volume of data
  - Don't look for the needle in the haystack; remove the haystack!
- **Do Not Simply Focus on the Front Door; Watch Doors and Windows**
  - Establish trust in your perimeter
  - Focus energies on what is leaving your network (data exfiltration, command and control comms, backdoor beaconing)
  - For either theft or disruption, outbound communications are necessary
- **Seek a Balanced Approach**
  - Remember, OT systems are targeted through IT systems, so you can't ignore either group
  - Avoid over-investing in specific defenses and neglecting others
  - Plan the work and work the plan; avoid distractions!

## TVA Can Help

### TVA and Partner Information Sharing

- Establishing peer groups among cybersecurity experts
  - Event notices and updates
  - Real-time event communications

### Collaborative Security Opportunities

- Direct security support
  - Emergency surge support
  - Managed security services
  - Resource sharing – people and tools
  - TVA's unique intelligence sources

### Training Opportunities

- Staff Sharing/Training
  - Send staff to TVA for embedded training and experience
  - Targeted training opportunities





## TVA Cybersecurity Outreach Program

### Cybersecurity Coordination Forums

- Recurring cybersecurity meetings
- TVA and customer cybersecurity personnel
  - Sharing of best practices
  - Current threat information sharing
    - FBI and DHS intelligence updates
  - Cybersecurity compliance support

### Specialized Topical Groups

- Informal technical discussions
  - Incident response and monitoring
  - Intelligence and threat indicators
  - Hardware/software recommendations





**For More Information:**

Philip Propes  
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)  
[pdpropes@tva.gov](mailto:pdpropes@tva.gov)